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Abuse of Power: Immigration
Courts and The Attorney
General’s Referral Power
Julie Menke 1
Abstract
In June 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued Matter
of A-B-. This decision vacated the holding of the 2014 Board of
Immigration Appeals decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-. In A-R-C-G-, the
adjudicator held that, depending on the specific facts of the case,
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship” constitutes a particular social group. Membership in a
particular social group is one of five ways to qualify for asylum in the
United States. Membership is based on a fact specific analysis
conducted by an immigration adjudicator. Sessions’s decision to vacate
Matter of A-R-C-G- had a devastating impact on the viability of asylum
claims for individuals fleeing domestic violence.
Matter of A-B- is just one of many instances where the Attorney
General has overruled the prior holding of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Immigration courts are housed under the Department of
Justice, and as head of the Department, the Attorney General can
exercise control over the immigration courts. Under federal regulation,
the Attorney General may direct an immigration decision from the
Board of Immigration Appeals to themself for review. The referral
power then allows the Attorney General to either affirm or overrule
decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B- is illustrative of the issues
with the Attorney General’s referral power. As a political appointee,
the Attorney General can refer any case to himself or herself at their
discretion and overturn years of precedent. In doing so, the Attorney
General interferes with the case-by-case adjudications by the
immigration courts. This delegation of power by Congress infringes on
the principle of separation of powers, as set out in the Constitution. It
is unwise to let a political authority hold so much power over
immigration decisions and intrude on the independence of the
immigration system. Decisions like Matter of A-B- illustrate how the
referral power can be easily abused and manipulated, and why limits
need to be placed on the Attorney General’s referral power.

1.

Julie Menke is a J.D. candidate at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, May 2020
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Introduction
On December 25, 2005, a mother and her three children entered the
United States without inspection. 2 Along with more than 50,000 others
that year, 3 her purpose in entering was to seek asylum in the United
States. 4 She was a longtime victim of domestic violence in Guatemala—
her husband abused her weekly. 5 He broke her nose. 6 He burned her
after throwing paint thinner on her. 7 He raped her. 8 After calling the
police several times for help, the officers told her they were unwilling

2.

Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014).

3.

2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 39, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
(Nov.
2006),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigr
ation_Statistics_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NNH-6NQH].

4.

Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.
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to interfere in her marital relationship. 9 Her attempts to leave the
relationship by running away to other cities and family’s houses were
unsuccessful and resulted in death threats from her husband. 10
After applying for asylum in the United States, an immigration
judge ruled the woman, referred to as “C-G-,” did not demonstrate
sufficient past persecution on account of her particular social group:
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship.” 11 This meant she did not qualify for asylum. 12 C-Gappealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
which acts as a governing body that oversees immigration judges’
decisions. 13 After reviewing C-G-’s case, the BIA held in Matter of AR-C-G- that, depending on the facts of the specific case, “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” could
constitute a particular social group as a basis for asylum in the United
States. 14 This was the first published precedential decision affirming the
validity of a particular social group of domestic violence victims. 15
Membership in a particular social group is one of five ways to
qualify for asylum in the United States. 16 Based on the definition of a
refugee, 17 an immigrant qualifies for asylum if they can prove that they
have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 18 Membership in a particular social group is based on a shared
characteristic that is either “so fundamental to individual identity or
conscience” that the individual should not be required to change, or is
a characteristic they cannot change. 19 It must be an “immutable
9.

Id.

10.

Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389.

11.

Id.

12.

Id. at 390.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 388.

15.

Board of Immigration Appeals Holds that Guatemalan Woman Fleeing
Domestic Violence Meets Threshold Asylum Requirement, 128 Hᴀʀᴠ. L.
Rᴇᴠ. 2090, 2093 (2015).

16.

AND
IMMIGRATION
Asylum,
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum
[https://perma.cc/V4SY-MYK5].

17.

Refugees and Asylees, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/refugees-asylees
[https://perma.cc/YVG9-LF8W].

18.

ASYLUM
Qualifying
for
Asylum,
POLITICAL
https://www.politicalasylumusa.com/application-for-asylum/
[https://perma.cc/59B5-Y9PN].

19.

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
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characteristic” that is visible to society and particularly defined as a
discrete class of persons. 20 This ultimately leads to underlying factual
questions of the group and the society in question to determine the legal
question of a “cognizable particular social group.” 21
Just four years after the BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G, thenAttorney General Jeff Sessions overruled the holding. 22 In Matter of AB-, Sessions held that the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G- improperly
applied precedent from other BIA rulings and did not properly consider
whether C-G-’s persecution was on account of her membership in a
particular social group. 23 His ruling effectively limited the availability
of asylum to victims of domestic violence. 24
Sessions’s authority to overrule BIA decisions and precedent derives
from a federal regulation that permits the Attorney General to review
BIA decisions. 25 Under the regulation, the Attorney General may refer
a BIA decision to themself for certification. 26 The BIA or Secretary of
Homeland Security may also refer a case to the Attorney General for
certification. 27 This referral power allows the Attorney General to either
affirm or overrule immigration decisions acting under his authority as
head of the immigration courts, which are housed exclusively under the
Department of Justice. 28 While a decision from the BIA is appealable
20.

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014).

21.

See id. at 227.

22.

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).

23.

Id. at 319–20.

24.

Id. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or
gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for
asylum.”); Stuart Anderson, The Sessions Asylum Decision: What Are
(June
13,
2018),
Its
Implications?,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/06/13/the-sessionsasylum-decision-what-are-its-implications/#81a1673776bb
[https://perma.cc/RX3J-D8VG].

25.

Organization, Jurisdiction, and Powers of the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2019).

26.

8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(i).

27.

8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(ii)-(iii) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney
General for review of its decision all cases that . . . the Chairman or a
majority of the Board believes should be referred to the Attorney General
for review . . . [or] The Secretary of Homeland Security, or specific officials
of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary with
the concurrence of the Attorney General, refers to the Attorney General
for review.”).

28.

Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch
Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority,
101 Iᴏᴡᴀ L. Rᴇᴠ. 841, 846–47 (2016); David Leopold, Five Chilling Ways
Senator Jeff Sessions Could Attack Immigrants as Attorney General,
POST
(Jan.
6,
2017),
HUFFINGTON
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to the federal courts, the adjudication process is reshaped when the
Attorney General co-ops a case from the BIA and puts themself
between the immigration and the federal courts. 29
In this Note, I argue that the power given to the Attorney General
to refer cases to themself is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power which infringes on the separation of powers set out in the
Constitution. Such a high-ranking political appointee should not be
involved in a legal analysis that rests on the interpretation and
application of a Congressional standard. I further argue that even if a
court is unlikely to rule this power unconstitutional, it is still unwise to
let a political authority hold so much power over immigration decisions
and intrude on the independence of the immigration courts. Decisions
like Matter of A-B- illustrate how the referral power can be easily
abused and manipulated, and why limits need to be placed on the
Attorney General’s referral power.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the immigration
system and the role of each of the three branches of the federal
government in this system.
Part II discusses the Attorney General’s referral authority and
where the authority to hold such control over immigration decisions
comes from. It further analyzes how this power has been used in the
past.
In Part III, I argue that the referral authority improperly allows
the Attorney General to interfere in the impartial immigration judge’s
decision-making. Intervening in a case-specific adjudication is a judicial
function, not a legislative or executive function. 30 Overstepping the
independent setup of the immigration judges and assuming the
jurisdiction of an Article III court is an unconstitutional interpretation
of the executive’s immigration power.
In Part IV of this note, I supplement this argument to explain that
even if a court would uphold the Attorney General’s referral authority
under the Constitution, it is still unwise to let a political appointee hold
such power over immigration decisions.
Finally, in Part V, I conclude that this power needs to be limited
in order to prevent further abuse. I propose first that Congress should
restrict the Attorney General from referring a case to themself for
review on their own initiative. This restriction would allow the
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/five-chilling-ways-senator-jeffsessions-could-attack-immigrants-as-attorneygeneral_us_5870022ce4b099cdb0fd2ef7 [https://perma.cc/F7FX-JSDJ].
29.

Fatma Marouf, How Immigration Courts Work, THE CONVERSATION
(June 25, 2018, 6:36 AM) http://theconversation.com/how-immigrationcourt-works-98678 [https://perma.cc/C33L-M9L5].

30.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)
(2013).
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Attorney General to review a decision only when the BIA or the
Department of Homeland Security requests review. Another solution is
to limit the Attorney General’s standard of review to equal that of the
BIA.

Part I: Structure of the Immigration System
Each branch of the federal government plays an important role in
the immigration system. 31 Under Article I of the United States
Constitution, the legislative branch has the power “[to] establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization.” 32 From this grant of power, Congress
has distributed immigration roles and powers amongst each branch of
the federal government. 33 The goal was to create an immigration system
that is favorable to desired immigrants, such as workers, families and
refugees, while simultaneously facilitating the removal of undesirable
immigrants, such as those posing national security risks, public charges,
or criminals. 34
A. The Legislative Branch

Congress has the power to create legislation that is the foundation
of U.S. immigration law. 35 The modern foundation of immigration law
is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”). 36 This
legislation revised earlier immigration statutes and created
comprehensive immigration law. 37 In addition to passing legislation,
Congress holds oversight hearings that review the internal workings of
executive immigration agencies. 38 This oversight is intended to check
the executive branch and ensure the executive is properly enforcing the
immigration legislation as Congress prescribed. 39
31.

See Megan Davy et al., Who Does What in U.S. Immigration, MIGRATION
POLICY
INST.
(Dec.
5,
2005),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/who-does-what-us-immigration
[https://perma.cc/9NFM-MMS5].

32.

U.S. Cᴏɴsᴛ. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

33.

See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43226, AN
OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS 1 (2013)
(describing the history of Congress’s distribution of power among the
other two branches).

34.

Id.

35.

DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 127 (6th ed. 2011).

36.

Id. at 128.

37.

Id.

38.

Id. at 127.

39.

Id. at 135-136.
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B. The Judicial Branch

The judicial branch has very limited participation in the review of
immigration laws and decisions. 40 The federal courts have upheld, on
numerous occasions, the plenary powers of the political branches of
government in determining immigration policy and laws. 41 They have
cited numerous reasons for their hands-off approach, including the
political question doctrine, lack of capacity in the courts to hear more
cases, and uniformity. 42 The judicial branch therefore leaves the
legislative and executive branches to determine the majority of
immigration law. Congress has, however, reserved the availability of
judicial review for constitutional claims and questions of law in
immigration cases. 43 In addition, the level of judicial review depends on
the interests involved. 44 Of the approximately 300,000 immigration
cases heard each year in the immigration courts, only around two
percent are appealed to the federal courts. 45 Of that two percent, on
average the federal courts agree to hear a mere eight percent. 46 Such
limited partition by the judicial branch in immigration matters leaves
significantly more responsibility to the executive branch.
C. The Executive Branch

As with other areas of law, the executive branch is charged with
enforcing the immigration laws Congress creates. 47 Congress, through
statutes, determines what class of non-citizens will or will not be denied
admission and removed from the United States. 48 The executive
enforces these statutes and determines who falls into each class based
on Congress’s guidance. 49 The executive cannot exceed the bounds of
Congress’s statutes. 50 Congress, however, has traditionally given the
executive broad powers in creating immigration procedures to enforce
40.

Id. at 97.

41.

Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration
Policy, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Feb. 25, 2009),
https://cis.org/Report/Plenary-Power-Should-Judges-Control-USImmigration-Policy#2 [https://perma.cc/5GVR-3GPK].

42.

Id.

43.

Immigration and Nationality
1252(a)(2)(D) (2013).

Act

§

242(a)(2)(D),

44.

LEE, supra note 33, at 1.

45.

Marouf, supra note 29.

46.

Id.

47.

WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 106–07.

48.

Id. at 107.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.
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the laws. 51 The executive therefore has extensive latitude to structure
its enforcement procedures however it sees fit.
There are six major executive agencies charged with enforcing
immigration laws: the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Social
Security Administration. 52 Congress transferred many of the
immigration functions originally delegated to the Attorney General to
the Secretary of Homeland Security after the department’s creation in
2002. 53 This department is now principally charged with enforcing and
administering immigration and citizenship benefits. 54 Up until the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice was responsible for the majority of immigration functions.55
After the creation of this additional department, the Department of
Justice has been charged with interpreting and administering federal
immigration laws. 56 The Department of State handles most immigration
petitions applied for outside of the United States. 57 The Department of
Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Social
Security Administration all play minor roles in enforcing immigration
laws. 58 Collectively, these six agencies work together to enforce the
immigration laws created by Congress.

Part II: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REFERRAL
AUTHORITY
Immigration courts are housed exclusively under the Department
of Justice. 59 The Executive Office for Immigration Review includes all
immigration courts as well as the BIA. 60 Immigration courts are made
up of immigration judges—attorneys appointed by the Attorney

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 109.

53.

WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 109. See Immigration and
Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

54.

WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 109–10.

55.

Id. at 118.

56.

Id. at 119. See also Homeland Security Act § 1101, 6 U.S.C. § 521 (2012).

57.

See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 115.

58.

See id. at 123–26 (describing the roles different departments and
administrations play in enforcing immigration laws).

59.

Leopold, supra note 28.

60.

Id.
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General to serve as adjudicators in immigration proceedings. 61 Unlike
Article III judges under the judicial branch, immigration judges serve
as adjudicators for the executive branch. 62 They are unlike
administrative law judges in other executive agencies, which are
certified, appointed, and supervised by independent agencies under the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 63 Administrative law judges are
afforded decisional independence protections under the Administrative
Procedure Act to ensure impartial and fair proceedings. 64 They are not
monitored or rewarded by the agencies they act under, and therefore
are not beholden to the interests of those agencies. 65 Immigration judges
are not appointed under the Administrative Procedure Act, but instead
by the Attorney General to act as their delegates in immigration cases. 66
If the decision of an immigration judge is appealed, it generally goes
to the BIA for review. 67 The BIA consists of twenty-one appointed
immigration judges 68 that review lower immigration judges’ decisions.69
The Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice, oversees
these immigration courts and the “judges” within each court. 70 These
judges, as individual employees of the United States Department of
Justice, act as the Attorney General’s agents and rule on immigration
cases. 71

61.

Immigration Judge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV.,
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/
[https://perma.cc/W868-78VJ]
(click the “Immigration Judge” hyperlink).

62.

See id.; Judicial Oversight v. Judicial Independence, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/include/side_4.html
[https://perma.cc/9K2K-WDFE] (“Unlike a United States District Court
judge, an immigration judge’s authority is not derived from Article III of
the Constitution, which establishes the Judicial Branch. Article III grants
United States District Court judges, United States Appellate Court judges
and United States Supreme Court judges the highest degree of judicial
independence — their appointments are made for life-tenure and must be
confirmed by the U.S. Senate.”).

63.

See generally 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).

64.

See 5 U.S.C. § 557.

65.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.
INTERPRETATION 761(2014).

66.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).

67.

OF
Board
of
Immigration
Appeals,
DEP’T
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals
[perma.cc/S56J-775B].

68.

Id.

69.

Leopold, supra note 28.

70.

8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2012).

71.

Leopold, supra note 28.

ET
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In addition to their power over immigration judges, the Attorney
General also has the power to unilaterally overrule precedent decisions
of the BIA. 72 The Attorney General may review a decision from the
BIA under three circumstances. 73 The Attorney General may refer a
case to themself, or may review a case at the request of the BIA or the
Secretary of Homeland Security. 74 In reviewing a BIA decision, the
Attorney General may either affirm the decision or vacate it and issue
their decision in place of the BIA’s. 75
The Attorney General receives this referral power from federal
regulation, in accordance with the broad immigration powers Congress
delegated to the executive branch. 76 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) states that
the Attorney General shall “review such administrative determinations
in immigrations proceeding . . . as the Attorney General determines to
be necessary.” 77 This delegation of power allows the Attorney General
to review BIA decisions when seen fit, even if neither the BIA nor the
Secretary of Homeland Security requests review. 78 While this power is
not exercised often, 79 its effect substantially impacts a wide variety of
immigration cases. 80
Unlike decisions by the BIA, which are confined to de novo review
of questions of law and clearly erroneous review of facts, the Attorney
General has de novo review of all aspects of the BIA’s decisions. 81 They
are not confined to reviewing legal or factual errors. 82 They additionally
are not bound by precedent from the immigration courts regarding law
or fact in the underlying proceedings. 83
Under the INA, “determination and ruling by the Attorney General
with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.” 84 A referral
decision by the Attorney General therefore is binding on the
72.

8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(i)-(iii).

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Feere, supra note 40.

76.

See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 123–26.

77.

8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2009).

78.

8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(i)–(iii).

79.

Laura Trice, Adjudication By Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards
In Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1771 (2010) (the Attorney General averaged
“only about 1.7 certified decisions annually between 1999 and 2009”).

80.

Id.

81.

Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 913 (A.G. 2006).

82.

Id.

83.

Gonzales, supra note 28, at 856.

84.

8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2009).
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government and the parties and overrules any inconsistent prior BIA
precedent. 85 Judicial review is available under certain circumstances for
the Attorney General’s decisions. 86 Upon review, an Attorney General’s
decision is entitled to deference consistent with the Chevron framework.
87

The Attorney General may elect to refer a BIA case to themself
that contains issues immigration courts are struggling to uphold
consistently. 88 The Attorney General may also choose to strategically
select cases for review to advance the presidential administration’s
immigration agenda. 89 Because the Attorney General’s decision is
binding throughout the immigration courts, they courts must follow
any clarification or new standard the Attorney General establishes. 90
Any prior BIA rulings inconsistent with the Attorney General’s decision
are then overruled. 91

Part III: Constitutionality of The Attorney General’s
Referral Decisions
The delegation of self-referral power to the Attorney General allows
them to review BIA decisions when seen fit. 92 Intervening in a case
specific adjudication, however, is a judicial, not legislative or executive,
function. 93 The Attorney General overstepping the independent setup
of the immigration judges—and assuming the role of an Article III
court—is an unconstitutional interpretation of the executive’s

85.

Gonzales, supra note 28, at 856.

86.

IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 1625 (15th
ed. 2016).

87.

Gonzales, supra note 28, at 857; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (establishing that the framework for judicial
review of executive interpretation of administrative rules is a two-part
test deciding whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise
question at issue,” and if it has, whether the intent of Congress is clear or
the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute).

88.

Gonzales, supra note 28, at 842.

89.

Id. at 920.

90.

See David A. Martin, Improving the Exercise of the Attorney General’s
Immigration Referral Power: Lessons from the Battle over the
“Categorical Approach” to Classifying Crimes, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11
(2016).

91.

Gonzales, supra note 28, at 841.

92.

Id. at 842.

93.

Immigration and Nationality
1252(a)(2)(D) (2005).

Act

609
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immigration power. 94 In reviewing immigration decisions, Article III
courts should therefore not give Chevron deference to such improper
decisions by the Attorney General.
A. Delegation, Deference and the Attorney General’s Referral Power

The Constitution granted Congress the authority to create
immigration law. 95 Through various laws and acts, Congress has
delegated certain legislative powers to the executive branch to develop
immigration law. 96 This raises the question of how much power
Congress has the authority to delegate. The non-delegation doctrine
concerns the relationship between Congress’s legislative powers and
administrative agencies taking on those powers. 97 The doctrine, in
essence, prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers to the
executive branch. 98 The Supreme Court, however, held in J.W.
Hampton v. United States that Congress can delegate quasi-legislative
powers to an executive agency. 99 This is conditioned on Congress giving
the agency an “intelligible principle” to base their regulations on.100
This intelligible principle is a general provision that allows the agency
to fill in the details and conform to Congress’s intent. 101
The Supreme Court has further developed the law controlling how
Congress may delegate quasi-legislative authority, how the executive
may use that authority, and how courts should review such
delegation. 102 In the 1984 landmark case Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court established the Chevron
doctrine.103 It set forth a two-part legal test for judicial review, where
courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous
statutory provisions. 104 The court must first determine if Congress
94.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).

95.

U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 4.

96.

WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 106-07.

97.

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (“The
nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers
that underlies our tripartite system of Government.”).

98.

See Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359,
361 (2017).

99.

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).

100. See id.
101. See id. at 406.
102. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629.
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
104. Id. at 842-44.
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implicitly delegated authority to the executive to interpret a statute.105
If the court finds Congress has delegated authority, it must next
determine whether the executive’s interpretation of the statute is
reasonable. 106 To determine reasonableness, the court must analyze
whether the agency’s action was based on a permissible construction of
the statute, even if the court would interpret the statute otherwise. 107
The Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference applies in the
immigration context. 108 It has additionally noted that judicial deference
to the executive branch in immigration proceedings is particularly
important. 109 It has further held that the BIA, vested with the Attorney
General’s discretion and authority, should be accorded Chevron
deference “when it gives ambiguous statutory terms meaning through
a process of case-by-case adjudication.” 110
Judicial review is available for questions of law regarding BIA or
Attorney General decisions. 111 An Article III court must defer to a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous immigration statute. 112 In the
context of immigration, this statute refers to Congress’s delegation of
immigration authority to the executive branch through the INA. 113 If
the court finds the INA to be unambiguous and the executive’s
interpretation in contradiction with the statute, the court will enforce
Congress’s clear intent as expressed in the statute and disregard the
executive’s interpretation. 114 Additionally, if the executive’s
interpretation of the statute is not reasonable, courts are not required
to give it Chevron deference. 115 In the immigration context, if the BIA
or Attorney General depart from or change their interpretation of the

105. Id. at 844.
106. Id. at 843-44.
107. Id. at 433.
108. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999).
109. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988).
110. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (recognizing the BIA’s role and explaining that
its case-by-case law-making adjudications deserve Chevron-style
deference).
111. See Stephen Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts;
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1615 (2000).
112. Jill Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries,
32 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 99, 116 (2018).
113. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).
114. Family, supra note 112.
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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INA, the new interpretation may be entitled to deference if supported
by a principled reason and explanation for the change. 116
Another factor of judicial review in immigration cases arises when
a federal court interprets a statute and the Attorney General or BIA
later interprets the statute in a different manner from the courts. 117 The
Supreme Court’s holding in Brand X requires courts to defer to an
executive agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute, overruling the
court’s prior interpretation. 118 Courts have held that this applies to BIA
and Attorney General decisions just as with other executive agency
decisions. 119 A BIA or Attorney General decision in conflict with a
court’s interpretation then applies prospectively, not retroactively to
immigration decisions. 120
B. Unconstitutional Delegation of Power to the Attorney General

The Attorney General’s self-referral power calls into question
whether the Attorney General can interfere in the immigration court’s
impartial adjudication—a judicial, not executive, function. The
Constitution does not permit an executive official to intervene in the
adjudication process by a neutral decision-maker and turn legal
interpretative decisions into political decisions. 121 Instead, a more
appropriate avenue for the Attorney General to exercise their power is
through rulemaking. Rulemaking, unlike case-by-case adjudication,
does not rely on the legal analysis of a sole adjudicator but instead
considers the input and concerns of experts in the particular field

116. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir.
2011).
117. Family, supra note 112, at 106.
118. Id. (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967 (2005)).
119. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 555 (3d Cir. 2018).
120. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016). In
accordance with Brand X, the Tenth Circuit addressed the problem of an
“executive agency, exercising delegated legislative authority, seek[ing] to
overrule a judicial precedent interpreting a congressional statute.” Id. at
1143 (emphasis removed). The Tenth Circuit held that executive agencies
can overrule prior judicial precedent, but that “does not necessarily mean
their decisions must or should presumptively apply retroactively to
conduct completed before they take legal effect.” Id. at 1148. In his
concurring opinion, now Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch additionally
explained “Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and
concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult
to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.” Id. at 1149
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1150.
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through the notice and comment process. 122 In the event that the
Attorney General does use their self-referral power, Article III courts
should not grant these improper decisions Chevron deference.
Legal interpretation of a statute can be achieved through one of
three methods. 123 First, Congress itself could determine the meaning of
the statute and the executive follows that meaning in deciding
immigration cases. 124 Second, if Congress leaves the statute ambiguous
without additional guidance, it could instead give the executive branch
the authority to use the quasi-legislative formal rulemaking process to
make a determination. 125 If a formal rulemaking requirement is not
explicit in the statute, the executive could instead choose to implement
informal notice and comment rulemaking to determine the statute’s
meaning. 126 Third, without further guidance from Congress, the
executive branch could use case-by-case adjudication to interpret the
ambiguous statute instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 127
For example, in Matter of A-B-, then-Attorney General Jeff
Sessions analyzed whether “married women who are unable to leave
their relationship” qualifies as a particular social group under the
INA. 128 What constitutes a “particular social group” is a question of
law requiring legal interpretation. 129
Congress has left the term “particular social group” ambiguous and
has given no further guidance. 130 This leaves the executive branch to
use either informal rulemaking or adjudication to determine its
meaning. 131 If the executive branch instigated rulemaking proceedings,
they would conduct a public notice-and-comment period to determine
whether “married women who are unable to leave their marriage” is the
kind of “particular social group” that Congress had in mind when
122. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 65, at 719. Rulemaking is additionally more
neutral since it applies across-the-board as opposed to only applying in a
particular case like adjudications. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at
1150.
123. See Esᴋʀɪᴅɢᴇ ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 83, 716–17.
124. See id. at 90.
125. See id. at 716.
126. See id. at 717.
127. See id. at 761.
128. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018).
129. See id. at 327–28.
130. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985), (“Congress did
not indicate what is understood [particular social group] to mean, nor is
its meaning clear in the Protocol.”).
131. See ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 716–17, 761 (discussing the
authority of the executive branch to interpret a statute absent
Congressional determination).
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granting asylum. 132 The result would either include or exclude that class
of persons from the statutory language. If the executive instead elected
to interpret “particular social group” through adjudication, immigrants
would argue for their membership in a particular social group in
individual cases. 133 The immigration judge then decides whether the
immigrant presented sufficient evidence of a “particular social group”
to qualify for asylum. 134
In interpreting the phrase “particular social group,” the executive
branch uses immigration judges to perform case-by-case adjudications
to interpret the phrase. 135 The immigration judge interprets the
meaning of particular social group based on prior immigration cases
and precedent. 136 This decision is appealable to the BIA and then can
be appealed to the federal courts. 137
This traditional adjudication process is reshaped when the Attorney
General replaces the BIA’s decision with their own interpretation. In
Matter of A-B, Sessions referred the case to himself from the BIA, at
his own discretion. 138 He then interpreted the group “married women
who are unable to leave their relationship” and broadly concluded that,

132. See id. at 717.
133. See id. at 161.
134. See id. at 183–84 (explaining that administrative law courts have the
power to issue decisions with the effect of law). See also Matter of A-B-,
27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 326–27 (A.G. 2018) (discussing the need for the
administrative law court to interpret the decidedly ambiguous phrase of
“particular social group”).
135. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 326–27.
136. Id. at 318-20.
137. Marouf, supra note 29.
138. Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B-, National
Immigrant
Justice
Center
7
(Jan.
2019),
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/contenttype/page/documents/2019-01/Matter%20of%20A-B%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201.2019%20Update%20-%20Final.pdf
[perma.cc/9DQM-DLZT] (“A-B-’s case was initially heard and denied by
Immigration Judge Couch at the Charlotte Immigration Court, a court
that is notorious for its harsh attitude towards asylum seekers. Judge
Couch has a greater than 85 percent denial rate in asylum cases. In A-B’s case, he made adverse findings on nearly all elements of her asylum
claim. On appeal, the BIA reversed on all grounds, found A-B-’s claim
similar to that of A- R-C-G-, determined she was eligible for asylum, and
remanded the case for issuance of a decision after background checks were
completed. On remand, Judge Couch did not follow the BIA’s order, but
instead attempted to certify the case to the BIA, asserting that A-R-CG-’s viability was no longer clear. At some point thereafter, Attorney
General Sessions learned of the decision, certified the case to himself . . .
.”).
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generally, no person under that category meets the definition of
“particular social group” and therefore cannot qualify for asylum.139
The INA sets forth a legal right for certain individuals to obtain
asylum, subject to judicial oversight. 140 It does not, however, state that
the Attorney General may adopt rules determining when asylum should
be granted. 141
As the head of an executive agency, the Attorney General must
have the power to make the legislative determination of what this
phrase means. 142 The Constitution gives judicial power to the “Supreme
Court of the United States, and to such lower Courts as Congress may
establish.” 143 Judges, acting as neutrals with no involvement in the
political sphere, then interpret statues in the context of specific factual
situations. 144 The executive branch may exercise this judicial power
when applying a statute to specific facts through quasi-judicial
adjudicators. 145 These adjudicators, such as immigration judges, are
independent arbitrators subject to judicial oversight. 146 If the
immigration judge has misinterpreted the INA or otherwise incorrectly
applied law, it is for the federal courts to review. 147
The Constitution ousts the Attorney General from exercising this
power and ousts Congress from conferring the authority. 148 When the
Attorney General certifies a case to themself, the case-by-case
adjudication becomes a tool for a purely executive officer to use to win
political points from the President who appointed them. 149 The
139. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 340.
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2019).
141. Id.
142. See generally ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 130–33 (discussing agency
interpretation and execution of law).
143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
144. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 95 (1984).
145. See ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 183–84.
146. See id. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10.
147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 761–
62.
148. ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 719 (discussing that agency decisions
are subject to judicial review).
149. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 847 (“‘This certification power,
though sparingly used, is a powerful tool in that it allows the Attorney
General to pronounce new standards for the agency and overturn
longstanding BIA precedent.’ This authority . . . gives the Attorney
General the ability ‘to assert control over the BIA and effect profound
changes in legal doctrine . . . ‘”) (quoting Joseph Landau, Doma and
Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81
Fᴏʀᴅʜᴀᴍ L. Rᴇᴠ. 619, 640 n. 89 (2012); Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by

615

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Abuse of Power

separation of powers in the federal government, however, does not
permit an executive official to intervene in the adjudication process and
turn legal interpretative decisions into political decisions. 150
In Justice Powell’s concurrence in I.N.S. v. Chada, he argues that
the House of Representatives’ use of a one-House veto is a violation of
separation of powers. 151 He found that the House’s action was “. . .
clearly adjudicatory. The House did not enact a general rule; rather it
made its own determination . . . [i]t thus undertook the type of decision
that traditionally has been left to other branches.” 152 Justice Powell
argues that by simply reviewing the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s findings, Congress assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to
the federal courts. 153
The same principle of separation of powers inherently applies when
the executive intervenes in the exercise of judicial power by the
courts. 154 The executive branch can perform quasi-legislative or quasijudicial functions, but only through quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
processes respectively. 155 The executive can make law through the
quasi-legislative processes of rulemaking or adjudication. 156 Unlike the
case-by-case adjudications, rulemaking applies across the board and
does not rely on the legal analysis of a sole adjudicator, making it an
overall more neutral legal interpretative process. 157
When the Attorney General becomes the adjudicator, it
additionally calls into question what deference the courts should give
the decision. 158 While courts should always consider the decision of the
Fiat: The Need for Professional Safeguards in Attorney General Review
of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1766, 1771
(2010)).
150. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
151. I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). I.N.S. v. Chada concerned a
provision in the INA that authorized either House of Congress to
invalidate the executive branch’s suspension of an individual’s
deportation. Id. The House used this provision to overrule the executive’s
suspension of Chada’s deportation. Id.
152. Id. at 964-65.
153. Id.
154. See Michael C. Dorf, Can Trump Interfere with the Courts and Judges?,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/cantrump-interfere-courts-and-judges-800340 [perma.cc/9DQM-DLZT].
155. See ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 716–17.
156. See id. at 761
157. Id. at 719.
158. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
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lower courts, Article III courts should not necessarily afford
immigration adjudication decisions by the Attorney General Chevron
deference. 159 The Supreme Court has held that Article III courts should
give immigration decisions Chevron deference when the executive “gives
ambiguous statutory terms meaning through a process of case-by-case
adjudication.” 160 The Attorney General, however, is not a formal
adjudicator like the immigration judges and does not consistently take
part in the case-by-case adjudications. 161 Instead, the Attorney General
steps in when they see fit and disrupts the case-by-case process the
immigration courts use to give ambiguous statutory terms meaning.162
Article III courts, therefore, should not give Chevron deference to the
decisions of the head of an executive agency who improperly intervenes
in a quasi-judicial proceeding as opposed to creating law through the
more neutral notice-and-comment rulemaking.

Part IV: Why The Attorney General’s Referral
Power Is Otherwise Improper
Even if a court would not find the Attorney General’s use of the
referral power unconstitutional, it is still otherwise improper. The
Attorney General’s interference threatens the immigration judge’s
independence from political influence and inserts a non-impartial, nonjudicial actor into the case-by-case adjudication process.

administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
159. See Stephen W. Manning, Judicial Deference in Immigration Cases,
Iᴍᴍɪɢʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Lᴀᴡ Gʀᴏᴜᴘ PC (2012), http://www.ilgrp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/Judicial-Deference-Article.pdf
[https://perma.cc/843F-LCDS].
160. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987).
161. See Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power,
102 IOWA L. REV. 129, 130 (2017) (“ . . . this [referral power] was
commonly used prior to 1956 to summarily affirm or deny decisions made
by agency adjudicators in the Board of Immigration Appeals…However…it
has been employed relatively rarely since then —albeit with greater
regularity during the George W. Bush era than during several previous
administrations, and the Obama presidency since.”).
162. Id. at 143 (“[E]xercise of the referral and review mechanism has in fact
disrupted the development of immigration law and policy. More
specifically, many recent Attorney General decisions can be understood
to have unsettled of judicial doctrine; suspended the long-term application
of statute; or altered the agency’s own longstanding practices, including
by virtue of partisan employment of the tool.”).
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A. The Attorney General is a Political Appointee

The referral power allows a purely executive official to take control
of a quasi-judicial adjudication process. 163 Unlike immigration judges
and the BIA, the Attorney General is a political appointee. 164 The
Attorney General changes with each new administration and their
actions reflect the positions of the sitting President. 165 This strong
connection to the President brings in outside political influence that
can have negative consequences for the integrity of the immigration
system. 166
As scholars have noted, a succeeding Attorney General can vacate
the decision of a prior Attorney General, 167 creating disunity with the
switch of every administration. 168 In 2009, then-Attorney General
Michael Mukasey certified a case and created a procedural framework
allowing the BIA to reopen proceedings based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 169 His decision overruled the lower immigration
court’s holding and prior BIA standards that held to the contrary.170
This “midnight agency adjudication” occurred in the transition between
President Bush’s and President Obama’s administrations. 171 Such
adjudications have been described as “attempt[s] to entrench a
particular policy choice in anticipation of a presidential transition
163. See id. at 153.
164. Id. at 132. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
165. See generally Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney
General,
Deputy
and
Associate,
Dept.
of
Justice, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-andfunctions-manual-attorney-general
[https://perma.cc/KTG8-H965]
(discussing how the change of a president affects the Attorney General
position).
166. See Shah, supra note 161, at 143 (discussing how the referral and review
mechanism causes disruption to the immigration system and interferes
with the evolution of immigration law).
167. See Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The need for Procedural
Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals
Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1766, 1771 (2010) (discussing the ability of
the Attorney General to swiftly vacate and reverse precedent).
168. See Shah, supra note 161, at 145–46 (exemplifying how quickly the
Attorney General can change immigration law precedent under a new
appointment, disrupting the natural evolution of the law).
169. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28. See also Shah, supra note 161, at
145–46.
170. See Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney
General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 Iᴏᴡᴀ L.
Rᴇᴠ. 18, 23–24 (2016) (“Compean and Silva-Trevino each overturned
settled BIA precedent . . . “).
171. Id.
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[g]iven the known or possibly different policy preferences of the
incoming administration.” 172
Attorney General Mukasey’s decision was vacated that same year—
soon after the transition from President Bush to President Obama.173
After taking office, the next Attorney General, Eric Holder, initiated
rulemaking proceedings to give the issue proper participation from all
interested parties. 174 He then reinstated the prior standards until the
proper changes could be made following the rulemaking process. 175 The
result was a back-and-forth in immigration policy over the course of
just one year, disrupting the natural progression of policies through the
case-by-case adjudication of the impartial immigration courts. 176
While the Attorney General’s decision can be appealed for judicial
review, this rarely occurs. 177 Additionally, the Attorney General’s
review power is more expansive than those of an Article III judge
reviewing a BIA decision. 178 The Attorney General has de novo review
of all aspects of the BIA decisions and is not confined to legal or factual
error. 179 This gives the Attorney General the freedom to produce
additional facts and briefing and is not confined to what the agency has
decided in the underlying proceedings. 180 The result is a political
executive appointee reviewing BIA decisions and interpreting the law
with greater discretion, rather than leaving the decision to judicial
review on appeal by a party to the case. 181

172. Id. at 24 (quoting Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching
Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L.
Rᴇᴠ. 557, 599 (2003)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 26.
175. Id.; Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (AG
2009).
176. See Shah, supra note 161, at 143–52.
177. Marouf, supra note 29 (“Immigrants may further appeal decisions made
by the Board of Immigration Appeals to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the
court one level below the Supreme Court. Very few can afford to do so.
Of the roughly 300,000 immigration cases heard each year, only 2 percent
are appealed to a federal judge. In 2016, 5,240 immigration appeals were
filed with the federal appellate courts. On average, nationwide, just 8
percent of those appeals are granted.”).
178. KURZBAN, supra note 86, at 1556.
179. J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 913 (AG 2006). See also Trice, supra note
167, at 1773 (discussing the Attorney General’s power to engage in de
novo review, superseding immigration judges and the BIA).
180. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 856.
181. See Shah, supra note 161, at 153 (“ . . . the Attorney General has
interrupted the development of immigration law by the judiciary, altered
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The immigration judges and BIA members are in a better position
to make immigration decisions impacting the life of so many
immigrants. 182 Experienced immigration judges are well aware of the
laws and practice of immigration law, as they adjudicate immigration
cases daily. 183 To become one of the 21 members of the BIA, 184 you must
be appointed by the Attorney General. 185 The Attorney General, on the
other hand, is more susceptible to improperly applying immigration
precedent. 186 They are not necessarily experts in immigration law and
instead, as chief lawyer of the federal government, oversee a wide
variety of Department matters. 187 The Attorney General is not required
to have experience in immigration before becoming head of the
Department of Justice. 188
While the Attorney General has staff that can advise them in the
area of immigration, 189 a political appointee such as the Attorney

legislative standards, and restructured the agency’s own application of
immigration policy, often with partisan interest in mind.”).
182. See Trice, supra note 167, at 1773–74, 1782 (discussing the Attorney
General’s tendency to skirt due process in immigration proceedings).
183. See Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Judges’ Union Calls for Immigration
Court Independent from Justice Department, WASH. POST (Sept. 21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/immigrationjudges-union-calls-for-immigration-courts-independent-from-justicedepartment/2018/09/21/268e06f0-bd1b-11e8-879278719177250f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76d3f580575d
[https://perma.cc/6F8X-Q423].
184. Board of Immigration Appeals, Dᴇᴘᴛ. OF JUSTICE (Oct 15, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals
[https://perma.cc/S56J-775B]
185. Andrew R. Arthur, DOJ to Expand the Board of Immigration Appeals,
FOR
IMMIGRATION
STUDIES,
(March
1,
2018)
CENTER
https://cis.org/Arthur/DOJ-Expand-Board-Immigration-Appeals
[https://perma.cc/L55X-9EHV].
186. See, e.g. Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B-,
supra note 138, at 8 (“Compounding matters is the Attorney General’s
chronic conflation of asylum elements throughout the decision. By
blending persecution with nexus, nexus with PSG, and PSG with
persecution, the decision makes parsing the elements tricky and
establishing asylum eligibility more daunting than the statute,
regulations, and case law require the process to be.”).
OF
JUSTICE,
187. See
About
the
Office,
DEPT.
https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office [https://perma.cc/Y7JF-NLA4]

188. See Id.
189. See, e.g., Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104, 109 (R.I. 2012) (“[A]nother member
of the attorney general’s staff would have handled [the] extradition.”).
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General is not well suited to decide immigration cases. 190 Due to the
complexity of the vast immigration laws and legal precedent, the
Attorney General is at risk of incorrectly applying legal precedent.
In Matter of A-B-, for example, Sessions applied a standard that
differed from previous immigration law precedent established by
immigration judges and the BIA. 191 He held that an asylum seeker
fleeing persecution from a non-governmental actor must show that the
government either “condoned” the persecution or was “completely
helpless” to stop it. 192 This interpretation differs from prior
interpretations from the BIA, as first defined in Matter of Acosta.193
Under the Matter of Acosta standard, an asylum applicant must instead
show that the government is “unable or unwilling” to protect them. 194
Just months after the issuance of Matter of A-B-, a federal judge
in the District of Columbia overturned parts of A-B- in Grace v.
Whitaker. 195 This case arose from a challenge to the application of
Matter of A-B- in the context of credible fear interviews. 196 The federal
judge held the Sessions’s holding in Matter of A-B- was arbitrary and
capricious “because there is no legal basis for an effective categorical
ban on domestic violence and gang-related [asylum] claims” and the
decision constituted an unexplained change to the long-standing
recognition of the individualized analysis required by the INA. 197 The
judge also found that Sessions’s departure from the long-standing
“unwilling or unable” standard, as established in Matter of Acosta, was
not a permissible construction of the persecution requirement that had

190. See Trice, supra note 167, at 1790 (discussing the likelihood for the
Attorney General to erroneously apply the complex law).
191. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (B.I.A. 2018).
192. See id. at 337; Jennifer Chang Newell, Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s
Policy Gutting Asylum for People Fleeing Domestic and Gang Violence,
ACLU (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:00 PM) https://www.aclu.org/blog/federaljudge-blocks-trumps-policy-gutting-asylum-people-fleeing-domestic-andgang-violence [https://perma.cc/9TTU-U3FE].
193. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (BIA 1985).
194. Id. at 222 (“[H]arm or suffering had to be inflicted either by the
government of a country or by persons or an organization that the
government was unable or unwilling to control.”).
195. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F.Supp. 3d 96, 126-27 (D.D.C. 2018).
196. Id.; Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B-, supra
note 138, at 15 (explaining that credible fear interviews are “the initial
asylum screening required for asylum seekers who request asylum at a
U.S. port of entry or are apprehended within a certain distance of the
border.”).
197. Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 125-26.
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long been settled. 198 This is not the first time a federal court has
overturned an Attorney General’s decision or declined to follow an
Attorney General’s interpretation of the INA. 199
The political nature of the Attorney General’s position additionally
raises due process concerns for individuals in cases before the Attorney
General. Procedural due process under the Constitution requires that
every individual be given notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a
decision by a neutral decision maker before being deprived of a
protected interest. 200 This requires impartiality on the part of those
acting in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities, such as arbitrators. 201 In
the immigration context, courts have held that this includes impartial
review “throughout all phases of [the] proceedings.” 202 This includes
review before an immigration judge, the BIA, or—on the rare occasion
it occurs—before the Attorney General. 203
While the immigration judges and the BIA on their own are
considered impartial and neutral towards each immigrant’s case, the
position the Attorney General holds raises impartiality concerns. 204 As
a political appointee, the Attorney General maintains a strong
affiliation with the President and the rest of their administration.205
They act as the President’s agent to advance the administration’s
political agenda. 206 An Attorney General can change prior precedent to
align with the new administration’s ideals by simply referring a case to
themself and vacating the prior interpretation or holding. 207 For
198. Id. at 130 (“[the unable or unwilling standard] was settled at the time the
Refugee Act was codified, and therefore the Attorney General’s condoned
or complete helplessness standard is not a permissible construction.”).
199. See Shah, supra note 161, at 155-65.
200. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 267–68, 271 (1970).
201. Id. at 271.
202. Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017).
203. See id.
204. See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts
Became a Deportation Tool, Sᴏᴜᴛʜᴇʀɴ Pᴏᴠᴇʀᴛʏ Lᴀᴡ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ 3 (2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policyreport_the_at
torney_generals_judges_final.pdf [perma.cc/E8YY-FE7N].
205. See David A.Graham, Ratcliffe’s Withdrawal Reveals Trump Still Doesn’t
Understand Appointments, Tʜᴇ Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ (Aug. 2, 2019, 2:35 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/whom-do-politicalappointees-serve/595342/ [https://perma.cc/XY6E-E88N].
206. See Jeffry Bartash, Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s Resignation Letter
Reveals Trump Told him to Step Down, MᴀʀᴋᴇᴛWᴀᴛᴄʜ (Nov. 7, 2018,
3:31 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/attorney-general-jeffsessions-resignation-letter-reveals-trump-asked-him-to-step-down-201811-07 [https://perma.cc/B5GR-QAUF].
207. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(h)(1)(i)-(iii) (2019).
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example, when Sessions vacated Matter of A-R-C-G-, he made it harder
for foreign victims of domestic violence to obtain asylum in the United
States—in accordance with the Trump administration’s policy of
restricting immigration to the United States. 208 To avoid political abuse,
immigration decisions should be left to the neutral immigration judges
and BIA to decide, rather than the politically affiliated Attorney
General.
B. Intrusion on the Independence of the Immigration System

The Attorney General’s referral power also interferes with the
independence of the immigration system. 209 Under the executive branch,
both immigration judges and administrative law judges perform quasijudicial functions in case-by-case adjudication. 210 But the judges in the
immigration courts are not like administrative law judges.211
Administrative law judges are certified, appointed, and supervised by
independent agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act,
ensuring autonomy for the judges and limiting inference by the agency
to control the judges. 212 Immigration judges are instead appointed by
the Attorney General to act as delegates. 213 While these judges already
lack the decisional independence guaranteed to other administrative
judges, the ability of the Attorney General to certify a case creates an
unnecessary layer of review. 214
Even as agents of the Attorney General, the BIA acts as an
independent reviewer of immigration judge decisions. 215 As long-term
employees of the Department of Justice that don’t change with each
administration, the BIA is not swayed by political considerations.216
The BIA’s decisions are not reflections of each administration’s views
on immigration policy, but instead are neutrally decided based on prior
BIA precedent. 217

208. Newell, supra note 192.
209. Peter J. Levinson, Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and
Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 644, 650 (1981).
210. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2019).
211. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2019); 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1978).
212. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1978).
213. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2019).
214. Levinson, supra note 209, at 648–50.
215. Board of Immigration Appeals, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, (Oct 15, 2018)
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals
[https://perma.cc/GGP8-RA4V].
216. Levinson, supra note 209, at 648.
217. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 850.
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Immigration judges are aware of the dangers of political influence
in the immigration system. 218 In 2018, The National Association of
Immigration Judges called for the independence of immigration courts
from the Justice Department. 219 The Association requested that
Congress make the immigration court an independent Article I court,
similar to the United States Tax Court. 220 The judges cited pressure
from the Trump Administration to decide cases faster and imposing
production quotas, which some judges argue undermines the “judicial
independence and immigrants’ rights to a fair hearing.” 221
Unlike the routine, case-by-case analysis used by the BIA and
immigration judges, the Attorney General selects each case as a policymaking device, 222 allowing them to leave a profound impact on the
immigration system. 223 In the majority of cases the Attorney General
refers to themself, the result favors deportation and only a minority of
results benefit the immigrant. 224 Additionally, in only approximately
thirty percent of cases where the Attorney General has reviewed and
issued a written decision has the Attorney General affirmed the BIA’s
decision. 225 In all other instances, the Attorney General has either
vacated or reversed the BIA’s decision. 226
Agency head control over their delegates is not a concept exclusive
to the Attorney General and the immigration system. 227 It is a decisive
tool executives can use to efficiently create consistency across
agencies. 228 In the immigration context, however, as some scholars have

218. Sacchetti, supra note 183.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Trice, supra note 79, at 1771.
223. Id.
224. Shah, supra note 161, at 146.
225. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 859.
226. Id.
227. Taylor, supra note 171, at 19 (“In a number of administrative contexts
including removal proceedings, adjudicators who decide contested cases
‘are employees of the very agency whose caseload they adjudicate…[And
thus] potentially subject to the supervision and control of one of the
interested parties. And it is typical that their decisions can be referred for
review by the agency head.”) (quoting Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee
Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional
Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 Sᴛᴀɴ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 475, 480 (2007)).
228. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 849–852.
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argued, these decisions are better left to the independent and
experienced immigration judges. 229

Part V: Limiting the Attorney General’s Selfreferral Power
The Attorney General’s referral power raises concerns regarding a
lack of guidelines and process. Immigration judges and the BIA follow
a process by which cases naturally progress through the immigration
courts. 230 The Attorney General, however, can overturn long-standing
BIA precedent without the same safeguards. 231 The Attorney General
can review any case where the BIA has rendered a decision. 232 The only
other requirement placed on this authority is that the Attorney
General’s decision must “be stated in writing and shall be transmitted
to the BIA or secretary, as appropriate.” 233
Proponents of the self-referral power argue that the procedure
allows the Attorney General to establish definitive interpretations of
immigration law and efficiently implement executive branch
immigration policy. 234 While the ability of the Attorney General to
review cases sua sponte may increase efficiency, it is easily subject to
abuse, as seen most recently in Matter of A-B-. 235
One way to curb the Attorney General’s control over immigration
courts is to restrict the ability of the Attorney General to refer a case
to themself for review on their own initiative. This would allow the
Attorney General to review a decision only when the BIA or the

229. See The AG’s Certifying of BIA Decisions, Jeffrey S. Chase (Mar. 29,
2018) https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifyingof-bia-decisions [https://perma.cc/9Z5F-RDKP] (“[The BIA] members all
come to the Board with far more expertise and experience in the field of
immigration law than the AG possesses . . . [T]he strongest arguments for
agency head review-inter-decisional consistency, and agency control . . .
over policy-don’t translate well to the process of deciding asylum
applications, for example.”).
230. See U.S. Dᴇᴘᴛ.
2 (2016).
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JUST., Iᴍᴍɪɢʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Cᴏᴜʀᴛ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴄᴇ Mᴀɴᴜᴀʟ 1–

231. Id. at 9.
232. 8 C.F.R § 1003.1(h)(1) (2019).
233. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(2) (2019).
234. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 841 (“This procedure permits the
Attorney General to adjudicate individual immigration cases and thereby
provide a definitive interpretation of law or institute new policy-based
prescriptions to guide immigration officials in the future…the history of
its invocation establishes it as a powerful tool through which the executive
branch can assert its prerogatives in the immigration field.”).
235. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (AG 2018).
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Department of Homeland Security requests review. 236 In the past, the
BIA requested the majority of cases reviewed by the Attorney
General. 237 Presently, out of the past twenty-six decisions reviewed by
the Attorney General, one has been referred from the BIA, fourteen
have been self-certified by the Attorney General, and eleven have been
referred by the Department of Homeland Security (or the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service). 238 By restricting the power to
review a case sua sponte, the Attorney General could no longer interfere
with the natural progression of immigration cases unless called upon by
their delegates or the Department of Homeland Security.
Even with a restriction on the self-referral power, the Attorney
General could still clear up inconsistencies amongst the BIA and
immigration courts. The BIA or Department of Homeland Security may
request certification of a case that adjudicators are struggling to uphold
consistently. 239 Because the Attorney General’s decision is binding
throughout the immigration courts, any clarification or new standard
the Attorney General implements creates a consistent standard for the
immigration judges to follow. 240 Any prior BIA rulings inconsistent with
the Attorney General’s decision would then be overruled. 241
Additionally, restricting the Attorney General’s referral power
would not leave the executive branch without reasonable pathways to
implement their immigration policies. The executive branch would still
be able to implement immigration policy through executive orders or
through the traditional rulemaking process. 242 Unlike case-by-case
adjudication, the rulemaking process applies across-the-board, as
opposed to only applying in a particular case like adjudications.243
Rulemaking is more neutral than adjudication as it does not rely on the
legal analysis of a sole adjudicator but instead considers the input and
concerns of experts in the particular field through the notice and
comment process. 244

236. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(h)(1)(ii)-(iii) (2019).
237. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 859.
238. Id.
239. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(h)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2019).
240. Martin, supra note 90.
241. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 856.
242. Id. at 898.
243. ESKRIDGE, supra note 65, at 719.
244. Id. (“Section 553 of the APA requires the agency to notify the public that
it is considering a proposed rule, and to invite public comments. Only
after reviewing the public comments can the agency issue a final rule,
which is subject to judicial review to weed out any requirement that
federal judges find to be ‘arbitrary and capricious.’”).
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Another solution to the Attorney General’s control over the
immigration courts is to limit the Attorney General’s standard of
review. 245 While decisions by the BIA are confined to de novo review of
questions of law and clearly erroneous review of facts, the Attorney
General has de novo review of all aspects of the BIA decisions and is
not confined to review of legal or factual errors. 246 This gives the
Attorney General the freedom to produce additional facts and briefing
and is not confined to what the agency has decided in the underlying
proceedings. 247 In this appellate role, it would make sense for the
Attorney General to have similar standards of review as the BIA has
in reviewing immigration judge decisions.

Conclusion
In June 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions used his referral
power to advance the Trump administration’s policy of restricting
immigration to the United States. His decision in Matter of A-Boverruled a BIA decision that granted asylum to female victims of
domestic violence. 248 Using his referral power, Sessions interrupted the
progression of immigration decisions granting asylum relief to victims
of domestic violence. 249
The Attorney General’s referral power is a unique control of power
over the immigration system. As a political appointee, the Attorney
General can refer any case to themselves at their own discretion and
overturn years of precedent. 250 In doing so, the Attorney General
interferes with the case-by-case adjudications by the immigration
judges and the BIA. A purely executive official is then performing a
quasi-judicial function. This ability of a political appointee to interfere
in the independent immigration process raises constitutional and policy
concerns. It is unwise to allow a political appointee hold such power,
which should be limited in order to prevent further abuse.
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